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Abstract 
To celebrate the 100th anniversary of Norwegian playwright Henrik Ibsen’s death, during 2006 
quite a number of cultural events were launched (cf. http://www.ibsen.net/). The paper suggests 
to celebrate Ibsen as a potentially useful resource for business ethics teaching. Departing from 
a short presentation of Ibsen’s plays An enemy of the people and A doll’s house the main focus 
of our paper is on two selected scenes from the latter piece – both as raw material for 
developing scenarios for moral maturity assessment (one of them is strikingly similar to and 
different from Heinz’ dilemma), and for teaching business students moral reflection and 
imagination. As an open end of the paper a few wider questions are asked about the use of 
literature in addition to or instead of ethics when it comes to triggering moral reflection and 
imagination. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When watching a theatre play or a movie or when reading a novel or even a poem we often 
find ourselves looking for essential points beyond the story, for main messages for us or even 
for others (such as our business class students). The inspiration value or even the enlightenment 
value of such an exercise can quite often be as high or can even be higher than reading 
mainstream business ethics textbooks (at least only such textbooks). 
This paper takes a look at if and how parts of the plays of Norwegian Henrik Ibsen can 
serve as food for thought in a business ethics teaching context. Many of Ibsen’s pieces are 
interesting and enjoyable in themselves, and potentially useful for triggering moral conflict 
awareness, empathy and reflection. The paper starts with a taste of Ibsen and offers then 
various debriefing steps. 
 
HENRIK IBSEN 
Norwegian Henrik Ibsen was born in 1828 and died in 1906, and quite a number of cultural 
events were launched, to celebrate last year’s 100th anniversary (after Shakespeare, Ibsen is the 
world’s second most played author on theatre scenes - cf. http://www.ibsen.net/). This paper 
celebrates Ibsen, too, as a potentially useful resource for business ethics research and teaching. 
Since Ibsen is frequently played and reasonably well-known, it is not surprising that not to be 
first, when it comes to using Ibsen in an ethics discussion and teaching context. Norwegian T. 
Eide for example2 claims that Ibsen in most of his plays creates “moral characters with moral 
deficiencies which may make the reader feel, think and reflect… (such as lacking) moral virtue, 
the ability (or willingness) to recognize elementary moral duties and to act according to these, 
the ability (or willingness) to see the moral implications or consequences of one’s actions  and 
the ability (or willingness) to honour the special obligations of close relationships… “ (Eide, 
2003, pp. 5-6, quotations shortened by present author). Eide maintains (ibid., p. 6) “… that: 
• most of Ibsen’s main characters suffer from these kinds of ethical deficiencies, that 
• this contributes significantly to the basic moral and existential ambiguity of the actual 
dramas, and that 
• this may also challenge the reader’s moral intuitions, emotions and imagination and 
provoke the reader to ethical reflection and judgement…”  
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TWO IBSEN PIECES: AN ENEMY OF THE PEOPLE AND A DOLL’S HOUSE 
Ideally, both teachers and students should watch theatre plays in the theatre. Somewhat less 
ideally one could buy or rent the respective DVDs and watch the pieces at home. The first 
mentioned play, En Folkefiende (An Enemy of the People) is available as a 2005 Norwegian 
movie and DVD in Norwegian language (with Norwegian West coast scenery as a backdrop 
and with subtitles in English – the movie is, however, really close to Ibsen’s plot, see 
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0447638/). The second play, Et Dukkehjem (A Doll’s House), is 
available as a theatre movie and DVD, starring Claire Bloom and Anthony Hopkins 
(http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0069987/ ). Still less ideally, one can use the Ibsen-year website 
(http://www.ibsen.net/) and take a look at the offical summary of both pieces. 
 
En Folkefiende (An Enemy of the People – first performed 1883) 
Tomas Stockmann is the father of a family and a doctor at a spa in a small Norwegian town. 
After a lengthy period of analysis he has discovered that the water of the spa that he himself 
had founded is polluted, and of great danger to the health of all its visitors. The spa is of great 
importance to the fame and prosperity of the town, but he is convinced that it must be closed 
until the fault is corrected. To begin with he is praised for his discovery, but when it becomes 
clear that the improvements will cost the town a great deal, both the press and the inhabitants 
turn against him. One of his most important opponents is his brother, who is mayor and chief of 
police, Peter Stockmann. From several quarters the doctor is asked to moderate his absolute 
demand that the spa be closed, but he calls a public meeting in order to present his case. It has 
now become the general opinion that the majority is always wrong and the minority always 
right. The people present at the meeting brand him as an enemy of the people and a threat to the 
town, and he is forced to leave the meeting. The whole affair has dramatic consequences for his 
family and himself – his patients desert him, he is dismissed from the spa, his daughter Petra 
loses her job as a teacher and the family lose their home. His first reaction, in rage and 
disappointment, is to plan to go abroad with his family, but when people start to break his 
windows and he receives sinister threats and offers, he realizes how little independence of mind 
there is in the town. He decides to stay there and devote himself to the task of bringing up 
citizens with a freer spirit.  (http://www.ibsen.net/index.gan?id=495&subid=0, translated from 
Andersen, 1995) 
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An enemy of the people is obviously relevant to business (and citizen) ethics, as a classical 
introduction to the issue of whistle-blowing.3 
 
Et Dukkehjem (A Doll’s House – first performed 1879) 
Nora Helmer is apparently happily married to Torvald, a lawyer who is about to take over the 
post of director of the Joint Stock Bank. They have three small children. Nora has a secret to 
keep, however. Early in their marriage Torvald became seriously ill, and the doctors advised a 
stay in a more southerly climate. Nora had to get hold of the money for the journey in secrecy 
and so borrowed it from Krogstad, a lawyer who had been a fellow-student of Torvald's. As 
security for the loan she forged her dying father's signature. Ever since then she has saved some 
of the housekeeping money in order to pay back the loan with interest, and she has taken on 
small jobs to earn some money herself. When the play opens, an old friend of Nora's, Mrs. 
Linde, has arrived in town to look for work, and Nora sees to it that Torvald gives her a post at 
the bank. But this means that Krogstad is dismissed from his post at the bank, and in 
desperation he goes to Nora and threatens to tell Torvald about the loan and the forgery unless 
he is allowed to keep his post. Nora is in despair but at the same time convinced that in his love 
for her, Torvald will sacrifice himself and take full responsibility for what she has done, if he 
learns the truth. Nora considers asking Dr. Rank, an old friend of the family, for the money, but 
when he declares his love for her, she finds it impossible to ask him. Torvald finds out what has 
happened, and reacts with rage and revulsion, without any sign of being willing to accept 
responsibility for the forgery. Mrs. Linde, who was in love with Krogstad in the past, gets him 
to change his mind and withdraw his threats. But Nora has begun to understand that her 
marriage is not what she thought it was, and in the course of a dramatic conversation with 
Torvald she decides that her most important and only task is to go out into the world on her 
own to "bring herself up", and she leaves her husband and children. 
(http://www.ibsen.net/index.gan?id=497&subid=0, translated from Andersen, 1995) 
 
A doll’s house is at least as well-known as An enemy of the people, as the classical presentation 
of a family woman’s liberation - from her wife and mother duties, to discovering her own role-
free identity and integrity (cf. about using this play in teaching e.g. Alexander and Sullivan, 
1996; Shade 2004).  
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TWO IBSEN SCENES 
When it comes to using literature for business ethics teaching, many students are probably 
skeptical, at least to start with. For such reasons, rather than addressing whole Ibsen plays such 
as the two plays mentioned, some further narrowing to one scene or two is suggested. (If one 
thinks that students deserve exposure to whole pieces, a first student assignment could be to 
isolate the most dense moral conflict situations in a piece and to share the criteria for one’s 
choice). Without such a preparation assignment, more specifically, we’d suggest two scenes 
from A doll’s house, both with a rather clear focus on the relationship between law versus 
morality or, in other words, between not getting caught versus unconditional caring  (for the 
complete text of the two scenes see appendix 1 below). 
The first scene could be taken more or less directly from the plot summary above. Nora’s secret 
story (told in a dialogue with Krogstad): Early in Nora’s marriage with Torvald her husband 
“became seriously ill, and the doctors advised a stay in a more southerly climate. Nora had to 
get hold of the money for the journey in secrecy and so borrowed it from Krogstad, a lawyer 
who had been a fellow-student of Torvald's. As security for the loan she forged her dying 
father's signature… When Krogstad (several years later risks to be) dismissed from his post at 
the bank… he goes to Nora and threatens to tell Torvald about the loan and the forgery unless 
he is allowed to keep his post…” (Andersen, 1995, op. cit.)  
The second scene needs to be summarized from the raw text of the play. In this second 
scene, Krogstad has sent and Torvald has just received and read “the letter”, telling the story of 
the loan and the forgery. Taking a combined prosecutor and judge and not least moral judge 
role towards his wife, Torvald addresses Nora with rage, as a both irresponsible and 
responsible subordinate (while Nora would have expected or hoped for a loving husband, 
loving back his wife unconditionally, for fulfilling her moral duty to care for her ill spouse and 
to protect her dying father). At its end, this scene changes dramatically when a new envelope is 
returned to Nora and opened by Torvald. The envelope contains the IOU, the loan document, 
i.e. the legal evidence of the forgery. Torvald’s debriefing sounds like him realizing a bad 
dream. It is not really the forgery as such, but the potential discovery of forgery which would 
have damaged the family’s moral reputation. (As shown in the plot summary above already, 
Ibsen’s Torvald considers the symbolic burning of the evidence as a happy end of a bad dream, 
while Ibsen’s Nora (after her classic reply to Torvald’s accusation and then his dropping of the 
case) leaves her husband, children, family, as a mixed unhappy/happy end). 
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After having let the students watch or read these two scenes, a business ethics teacher could ask 
his/her business ethics students to look themselves for principal questions which are raised and 
illustrated in the two selected scenes (or ask the questions right away): 
• Can there be any good moral reasons for (sometimes) breaking the law and risking the 
sanctions for this? 
• Is there a moral establishment and does such establishment and its morality stand critical 
questions, and what is the response to such critical questions? 
• How important are moral facades, e.g. compared to the internal culture or moral climate of 
a group, in this case of a marital relationship? 
 
TORVALD’S TEMPTATION AND NORA’S DILEMMA 
Before or rather after asking the principal questions, one could also ask the students for an 
abstraction exercise - to reconstruct and formulate “in their own words” at least two core moral 
conflict scenarios from the original scenes, in a more or less general, anonymous and everyday 
language format. Their solution to the task should look similar to the following two conflict 
scenario descriptions:  
Torvald’s temptation: A husband and bank manager (trained as a lawyer) receives a “letter”, 
telling that his wife some years ago has forged a signature on a private loan document, i.e. 
committed a clear criminal offence. He has reason to believe that there exists evidence for such 
a claim and that such evidence could be used for blackmailing him in his work role, namely to 
re-employ the potential blackmailer (he has as a matter of fact recently fired the person, using 
the person’s forgery a long time ago as a justification). He feels that by giving in to a 
blackmailer he becomes morally co-responsible. Even more so, he feels very uneasy indeed for 
being vulnerable, for being exposed to the mercy of a blackmailer. On the other hand, the 
whole situation is quite unique. If he re-employs the author of the letter this will silence him. 
Not yielding to the threat or even going public with the letter appears to be uneasy indeed: his 
public reputation as a good citizen will be hurt for ever, as he sees it.  
Should he stick to his principles or should he give in to the temptation, and choose the 
way of least resistance by re-employing the letter-writer and rather accept a somewhat hurt 
self-image? Are there other relevant arguments or viable alternatives worth considering? Is the 
situation altered if the loan document (i.e. the legal evidence of the forgery) is returned, and if 
yes in which respect and why? 
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If the whole story (and its morale) has been told already, Torvald risks a biased judgement. For 
reducing such a possible bias, one could try to read “his” temptation story and try to understand 
him and his mindset, before judging him from hindsight, i.e. Nora’s dilemma story (and her 
eventual leaving of the doll’s house in spite of the temptation to stay, with a Torvald with a 
reformed mindset). At least at first sight, Torvald’s point of departure looks Kantian: neither 
forgery nor yielding to blackmailing stands a categorical imperative test (while the inclination 
to forget the whole story since it won’t show in public anyway looks much less Kantian). 
Nora’s dilemma: A man was seriously ill. The only therapy that the doctors thought might save 
him was taking a leave of absence from his work for a lengthy stay in a warmer country. Such a 
stay implied a loss of income, and at the same time traveling and staying expenses. The sick 
husband’s wife, Nora, without any income of her own, couldn’t see any other alternative than 
borrowing the money, from a distant friend of the family, without telling her husband (who for 
male self-respect reasons which were normal at that time would not accept money from such a 
loan). When the creditor asks for a guarantor for the loan, Nora’s only choice, as she sees it, is 
either asking her dying father for his signature or leaving him in peace and faking his signature 
for getting the loan.  
Should Nora forge the signature for getting the loan and saving her husband’s health 
and sparing her dying father from sorrows? 
 
One might say that here lies a risk of bias, too – such as interpreting Nora’s dilemma with the 
hindsight of Torvald’s reaction later in the piece.4 
 
USING MORAL CONFLICT SCENARIOS FOR ASSESSMENT AND FOR A 
DEBRIEFING WHICH FOCUSES ON THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT RESPONSES 
 
Still another teaching possibility is to start with a paper and pencil test, where these (or similar) 
scenarios, alone or together with additional ones, function as a warm up exercise at the 
beginning of a business ethics course or a business ethics teaching unit, as projective tests, for 
assessing the students’ ability and willingness to moral reasoning. One could for example ask 
the students open questions about the presented situation(s), e.g. to write a short essay about 
what they would recommend Torvald or Nora (or Heinz) to do, and, not least, which reasons 
they would give for the recommendations. One could even try to code the answers as an 
indication of moral maturity, e.g. in the Kohlberg tradition into pre-conventional, conventional 
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and post-conventional reasoning,5 or perhaps in the Gilligan tradition as an indication of 
fairness versus caring concepts of ethics (cf. exhibit #1, referring to Nora’s dilemma only).6 
 
 
Kohlberg’s levels Kohlberg’s 
stages 
Examples of possible argument focus in 
Nora’s dilemma 
obedience out 
of fear 
risk of detection and punishment pre-conventional 
(inner-directed = 
egoistic, ethically 
questionable) 
instrumental 
egoism 
feeling uneasy about bothering father or 
husband 
nice  
boy/ girl 
a good wife would typically do this conventional 
 
(outer-directed, moral 
conformism) 
law&order-
obedience 
forgery is forbidden by law 
consensus by 
procedure 
this would be unfair towards the creditor post-conventional 
(inner-directed, idealistic 
and altruistic) independent 
idealism 
the health and life of the husband can be a 
higher core value than the creditor’s right 
fairness 
concept of ethics 
The essence of this case is how justified one is in special 
cases to break the law for assumed good principles or 
purposes 
care 
concept of ethics 
Empathy and doing good or avoiding harm for individuals 
in need is primary 
Exhibit #1 
 
All the different responses, qualitative ones or more standardized ones, would then represent 
moral maturity differences in the classroom, so to speak the raw material of mindsets addressed 
by teaching. Having been forced to think through the situation and to find an answer to the 
questions and writing it down represents a good point of departure for a classroom discussion 
(even without necessarily summarising and analysing the responses “as data”). In addition to 
collecting and summarizing the answers to the scenarios, perhaps even interactively, one can 
ask a number of follow up questions, for each of the conflict situations separately, such as: 
• What would you consider to be the most important points made or theses communicated in 
the Nora’s dilemma scene? (Then, if not mentioned clearly…) 
• probe more precisely for the students’ thoughts about competing moral and legal 
arguments; 
• then, perhaps, ask how the moral heterogeneity in the classroom is perceived (and how one 
would suggest to handle such heterogeneity); 
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• then, perhaps, one would ask if the students recall similar situations from their own 
experience. 
Similarly, one could address the Torvald’s temptation scene: 
• What do you consider to be the most important points made or theses communicated in the 
Torvald scene? (Then, if not mentioned clearly…)   
• probe more precisely for the students’ thoughts about the relationship between giving in to 
or resisting blackmailing pressure or about the relationship between internal moral climate 
and external moral reputation; 
• then again, perhaps, ask how the moral heterogeneity in the classroom is perceived (and 
how one would suggest to handle such heterogeneity) and if the students recall similar 
situations from their own experience. 
 
Either one chooses to address both situations after one another first or simultaneously right 
away, the most interesting approach is probably to ask  
• if and how one could read the second scene as Torvald’s debriefing after Nora’s choice in 
her dilemma, also,  
• perhaps, probe more precisely for the students’ thoughts about 19th century gender and 
family roles as an explanation of or even as an excuse of Nora’s forgery (“for a good 
purpose”) and of Torvald’s response. 
The scenes from A Doll’s House could also be presented later in a business ethics course, e.g. 
until after having addressed various schools of moral philosophy. In such a case, additional 
questions could be asked, such as if and how one could formulate “typical” consequentialist 
versus non-consequentialist arguments and standpoints in such cases, perhaps also “traditional” 
versus “contemporary” philosophical positions (Crane and Matten, 2007). 
 
A FEW ADDITIONAL REMARKS ABOUT BUSINESS ETHICS TEACHING 
So far this paper can be read as a rather practical suggestion for a business ethics teaching unit, 
inviting business students to a conflict case discussion and to reflect about maturity differences 
in moral reasoning, perhaps also about justice versus care ethical reasoning. If such a unit is 
well-delivered, well de-briefed and eventually leaves some traces in the student mindsets, one 
could say that it justifies itself – why ask for more? In this section a few more general remarks 
can be added about the legitimacy of using literature when teaching business ethics to business 
students. 
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 Business ethics teaching is about reaching one or a few more or less well-defined and 
well-justified objectives (“why go where?”), addressing business students with a more or less 
given and more or less heterogeneous mindset (“go from where?”), preferably with some 
minimum of dialogue about best ways (“don’t go alone!” - cf. Brinkmann and Sims, 2001). 
 As a short input to such an important dialogue about best ways to teach business ethics 
we’d like to borrow some thoughts and formulations from a relatively recent paper of Richard 
Rorty, whose main addressees are business ethicists and whose main focus is on questioning 
the legitimacy of philosophy and moral philosophy as primary bases of our discipline (Rorty, 
2006, esp. pp. 369-375).7 This reference is chosen because Rorty’s line of argument seems 
particularly convincing (i.e. “useful” in Rorty’s terminological tradition) if rephrased as a 
teaching “philosophy” for our field, as a suggestion of most important ends and means. For 
brevity, his main points can be summarized as follows:8 
• Business ethics teaching is not an end in itself, but should eventually contribute to world 
and business world improvement (9, 10).  
• The main objective of business ethics teaching is development of  
o moral imagination (4) 
o empathy (5) 
o ability to justify and convince (2, 3) 
o paradigmatic conflict cases (narratives) and context specific guidelines (6) 
• The main media of teaching and learning business ethics in such a way are 
o narratives or cases (7) and 
o a diversity of training backgrounds among business ethics teachers (8). 
 
Or in one long sentence: the more it is concerned with moral reflection and moral imagination 
as a primary objective, the more business ethics teaching should look for suitable literature 
pieces (such as Ibsen-pieces) and hope that such an approach almost sufficiently will further 
goal achievement, i.e. moral imagination and empathy development, since the important 
medium, telling good stories well, is left to the experts: novelists and playwrights. 
 
Singer and Singer market their anthology The Moral of the Story. An Anthology of Ethics 
through Literature (2005) with similar arguments:  
“… For philosophers the example is merely a tool, like a piece of equipment for a scientist. As 
long as it does the job, they have no interest in embellishing it, for they are interested in 
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abstract questions, not in the specifics… Philosophical examples in ethics usually lack depth, 
the characters in them are ciphers, and the context is absent or at best, briefly sketched… 
Novels, short stories, plays, and poems shed different kinds of light on ethical questions. Some 
have thought that great literature should be edifying and provide models of good behavior… It 
is surely true that the detailed and creative exploration of a situation that can emerge from a 
good novel can help us to understand more about ourselves, and how we ought to live. In 
contrast to the examples discussed in works of philosophy, discussions of ethical issues in 
fiction tend to be concrete, rather than abstract, and to give a rich context for the distinctive 
moral views or choices that are portrayed. Literature therefore often presents a more nuanced 
view of character and circumstances than is to be found in the works of philosophers…” 
(Singer and Singer, 2005, pp. x-xi) 
 
In the end, successful teaching (or should one say marketing?) of business ethics to 
more or less heterogeneous business students is a question of meeting and respecting the target 
group’s  mindset and expectations. The author’s own experience suggests that complex, 
contradictory and perhaps unfinished stories or cases work relatively best. Honest scepticism is 
more productive than politically correct questions and answers. Favouring sceptical and critical 
students as a target group does not leave the other students empty-handed either (but leaves 
them with well-told stories which simply can be read as interesting and entertaining in 
themselves). The alternative would be worse: boring and not satisfying or even frustrating the 
sceptical and critical students and furthering superficial lip-service moralism rather than 
reflection among the rest.9  
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APPENDIX 1: TWO SCENES FROM A DOLL’S HOUSE 
The two scenes (which are the main raw material of this paper) read as original-version texts as 
follows (source: http://www.enotes.com/dollshouse-text/):  
 
1st (selected) scene 
Krogstad. When your husband was ill, you came to me to borrow two hundred and fifty pounds. 
 
Nora. I didn't know any one else to go to. 
 
Krogstad. I promised to get you that amount-- 
 
Nora. Yes, and you did so. 
 
Krogstad. I promised to get you that amount, on certain conditions. Your mind was so taken up with 
your husband's illness, and you were so anxious to get the money for your journey, that you seem to 
have paid no attention to the conditions of our bargain. Therefore it will not be amiss if I remind you of 
them. Now, I promised to get the money on the security of a bond which I drew up. 
 
Nora. Yes, and which I signed. 
 
Krogstad. Good. But below your signature there were a few lines constituting your father a surety for 
the money; those lines your father should have signed. 
 
Nora. Should? He did sign them. 
 
Krogstad. I had left the date blank; that is to say your father should himself have inserted the date on 
which he signed the paper. Do you remember that? 
 
Nora. Yes, I think I remember-- 
 
Krogstad. Then I gave you the bond to send by post to your father. Is that not so? 
 
Nora. Yes. 
 
Krogstad. And you naturally did so at once, because five or six days afterwards you brought me the 
bond with your father's signature. And then I gave you the money. 
 
Nora. Well, haven't I been paying it off regularly? 
 
Krogstad. Fairly so, yes. But--to come back to the matter in hand--that must have been a very trying 
time for you, Mrs. Helmer? 
 
Nora. It was, indeed. 
 
Krogstad. Your father was very ill, wasn't he? 
 
Nora. He was very near his end. 
 
Krogstad. And died soon afterwards? 
 
Nora. Yes. 
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Krogstad. Tell me, Mrs. Helmer, can you by any chance remember what day your father died?--on what 
day of the month, I mean. 
 
Nora. Papa died on the 29th of September. 
 
Krogstad. That is correct; I have ascertained it for myself. And, as that is so, there is a discrepancy 
(taking a paper from his pocket) which I cannot account for. 
 
Nora. What discrepancy? I don't know-- 
 
Krogstad. The discrepancy consists, Mrs. Helmer, in the fact that your father signed this bond three 
days after his death. 
 
Nora. What do you mean? I don't understand-- 
 
Krogstad. Your father died on the 29th of September. But, look here; your father dated his signature the 
2nd of October. It is a discrepancy, isn't it? (NORA is silent.) Can you explain it to me? (NORA is still 
silent.) It is a remarkable thing, too, that the words "2nd of October," as well as the year, are not written 
in your father's handwriting but in one that I think I know. Well, of course it can be explained; your 
father may have forgotten to date his signature, and someone else may have dated it haphazard before 
they knew of his death. There is no harm in that. It all depends on the signature of the name; and that is 
genuine, I suppose, Mrs. Helmer? It was your father himself who signed his name here? 
 
Nora (after a short pause, throws her head up and looks defiantly at him). No, it was not. It was I that 
wrote papa's name. 
 
Krogstad. Are you aware that is a dangerous confession? 
 
Nora. In what way? You shall have your money soon. 
 
Krogstad. Let me ask you a question; why did you not send the paper to your father? 
 
Nora. It was impossible; papa was so ill. If I had asked him for his signature, I should have had to tell 
him what the money was to be used for; and when he was so ill himself I couldn't tell him that my 
husband's life was in danger--it was impossible. 
 
Krogstad. It would have been better for you if you had given up your trip abroad. 
 
Nora. No, that was impossible. That trip was to save my husband's life; I couldn't give that up. 
 
Krogstad. But did it never occur to you that you were committing a fraud on me? 
 
Nora. I couldn't take that into account; I didn't trouble myself about you at all. I couldn't bear you, 
because you put so many heartless difficulties in my way, although you knew what a dangerous 
condition my husband was in. 
 
Krogstad. Mrs. Helmer, you evidently do not realise clearly what it is that you have been guilty of. But I 
can assure you that my one false step, which lost me all my reputation, was nothing more or nothing 
worse than what you have done. 
 
Nora. You? Do you ask me to believe that you were brave enough to run a risk to save your wife's life. 
 
Krogstad. The law cares nothing about motives. 
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Nora. Then it must be a very foolish law. 
 
Krogstad. Foolish or not, it is the law by which you will be judged, if I produce this paper in court. 
 
Nora. I don't believe it. Is a daughter not to be allowed to spare her dying father anxiety and care? Is a 
wife not to be allowed to save her husband's life? I don't know much about law; but I am certain that 
there must be laws permitting such things as that. Have you no knowledge of such laws--you who are a 
lawyer? You must be a very poor lawyer, Mr. Krogstad. 
 
Krogstad. Maybe. But matters of business--such business as you and I have had together--do you think I 
don't understand that? Very well. Do as you please. But let me tell you this--if I lose my position a 
second time, you shall lose yours with me. (He bows, and goes out through the hall.) 
 
 
2nd  (selected) scene 
 
Helmer. What is this? Do you know what is in this letter? 
 
Nora. Yes, I know. Let me go! Let me get out! 
 
Helmer (holding her back). Where are you going? 
 
Nora (trying to get free). You shan't save me, Torvald! 
 
Helmer (reeling). True? Is this true, that I read here? Horrible! No, no--it is impossible that it can be 
true. 
 
Nora. It is true. I have loved you above everything else in the world. 
 
Helmer. Oh, don't let us have any silly excuses. 
 
Nora (taking a step towards him). Torvald--! 
 
Helmer. Miserable creature--what have you done? 
 
Nora. Let me go. You shall not suffer for my sake. You shall not take it upon yourself. 
 
Helmer. No tragedy airs, please. (Locks the hall door.) Here you shall stay and give me an explanation. 
Do you understand what you have done? Answer me? Do you understand what you have done? 
 
Nora (looks steadily at him and says with a growing look of coldness in her face). Yes, now I am 
beginning to understand thoroughly. 
 
Helmer (walking about the room). What a horrible awakening! All these eight years--she who was my 
joy and pride--a hypocrite, a liar--worse, worse--a criminal! The unutterable ugliness of it all!--For 
shame! For shame! (NORA is silent and looks steadily at him. He stops in front of her.) I ought to have 
suspected that something of the sort would happen. I ought to have foreseen it. All your father's want of 
principle--be silent!--all your father's want of principle has come out in you. No religion, no morality, 
no sense of duty--How I am punished for having winked at what he did! I did it for your sake, and this 
is how you repay me. 
 
Nora. Yes, that's just it. 
 
Helmer. Now you have destroyed all my happiness. You have ruined all my future. It is horrible to think 
of! I am in the power of an unscrupulous man; he can do what he likes with me, ask anything he likes of 
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me, give me any orders he pleases--I dare not refuse. And I must sink to such miserable depths because 
of a thoughtless woman! 
 
Nora. When I am out of the way, you will be free. 
 
Helmer. No fine speeches, please. Your father had always plenty of those ready, too. What good would 
it be to me if you were out of the way, as you say? Not the slightest. He can make the affair known 
everywhere; and if he does, I may be falsely suspected of having been a party to your criminal action. 
Very likely people will think I was behind it all--that it was I who prompted you! And I have to thank 
you for all this--you whom I have cherished during the whole of our married life. Do you understand 
now what it is you have done for me? 
 
Nora (coldly and quietly). Yes. 
 
Helmer. It is so incredible that I can't take it in. But we must come to some understanding. Take off that 
shawl. Take it off, I tell you. I must try and appease him some way or another. The matter must be 
hushed up at any cost. And as for you and me, it must appear as if everything between us were as 
before--but naturally only in the eyes of the world. You will still remain in my house, that is a matter of 
course. But I shall not allow you to bring up the children; I dare not trust them to you. To think that I 
should be obliged to say so to one whom I have loved so dearly, and whom I still--. No, that is all over. 
From this moment happiness is not the question; all that concerns us is to save the remains, the 
fragments, the appearance-- 
 
(A ring is heard at the front-door bell.) 
 
Helmer (with a start). What is that? So late! Can the worst--? Can he--? Hide yourself, Nora. Say you 
are ill. 
 
(NORA stands motionless. HELMER goes and unlocks the hall door.) 
 
Maid (half-dressed, comes to the door). A letter for the mistress. 
 
Helmer. Give it to me. (Takes the letter, and shuts the door.) Yes, it is from him. You shall not have it; I 
will read it myself. 
 
Nora. Yes, read it. 
 
Helmer (standing by the lamp). I scarcely have the courage to do it. It may mean ruin for both of us. No, 
I must know. (Tears open the letter, runs his eye over a few lines, looks at a paper enclosed, and gives a 
shout of joy.) Nora! (She looks at him, questioningly.) Nora! No, I must read it once again--. Yes, it is 
true! I am saved! Nora, I am saved! 
 
Nora. And I? 
 
Helmer. You too, of course; we are both saved, both saved, both you and I. Look, he sends you your 
bond back. He says he regrets and repents--that a happy change in his life--never mind what he says! 
We are saved, Nora! No one can do anything to you. Oh, Nora, Nora!--no, first I must destroy these 
hateful things. Let me see--. (Takes a look at the bond.) No, no, I won't look at it. The whole thing shall 
be nothing but a bad dream to me. (Tears up the bond and both letters, throws them all into the stove, 
and watches them burn.) There--now it doesn't exist any longer. He says that since Christmas Eve you--. 
These must have been three dreadful days for you, Nora. 
 
Nora. I have fought a hard fight these three days. 
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Helmer. And suffered agonies, and seen no way out but--. No, we won't call any of the horrors to mind. 
We will only shout with joy, and keep saying, "It's all over! It's all over!" Listen to me, Nora. You don't 
seem to realise that it is all over. What is this?--such a cold, set face! My poor little Nora, I quite 
understand; you don't feel as if you could believe that I have forgiven you. But it is true, Nora, I swear 
it; I have forgiven you everything. I know that what you did, you did out of love for me. 
 
Nora. That is true. 
 
Helmer. You have loved me as a wife ought to love her husband. Only you had not sufficient 
knowledge to judge of the means you used. But do you suppose you are any the less dear to me, because 
you don't understand how to act on your own responsibility? No, no; only lean on me; I will advise you 
and direct you. I should not be a man if this womanly helplessness did not just give you a double 
attractiveness in my eyes. You must not think any more about the hard things I said in my first moment 
of consternation, when I thought everything was going to overwhelm me. I have forgiven you, Nora; I 
swear to you I have forgiven you. 
 
Nora. Thank you for your forgiveness. (She goes out through the door to the right.) 
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APPENDIX 2: 
RORTY’S ADVICE FOR TEACHING BUSINESS ETHICS –  
BROKEN DOWN INTO 10 THESES 
 
#1  Instead of a focus on understanding the world (as most philosophers do) one should rather focus 
on trying to change it (Rorty, 2006, p. 371, referring to Marx’ Feuerbach-thesis); 
 
#2  “Though truth and wrongness are not relative notions, justification is. For what counts as 
justification… is always relative to the antecedent beliefs of those whom one is seeking to 
convince…” (p. 371). 
 
#3  “… The main task of philosophy these days should be to complete the process of secularising 
culture – to convince people to stop looking for God-surrogates… The right question is … what is 
it useful to talk about…” (p. 374) 
 
#4  Moral imagination is a necessary, perhaps a sufficient condition for creative managerial decision-
making. Moral imagination is not a supplement to moral theory and moral reasoning skills, but … 
pretty much all you need (pp. 375-376).10  
 
#5  “… An increase in benevolence – in willingness to take the needs of others into account- is 
possible only when people have enough security and leisure to imagine what it must be like to be 
someone … in a very different situation than their own…” (p. 376) 
 
#6  “Business ethicists might do better to think of themselves as social engineers working on site-
specific projects. The two most useful tools for such work… are narratives, whether historical or 
fictional, and what Laura Nash calls ‘context-specific guidelines’…” (Rorty, 2006, p. 377, 
referring to Nash, 2000). 
 
#7  “…Whether a narrative is historical or fictional does not matter as much as whether it enables the 
reader to put herself in the shoes both of those making difficult business decisions and of those 
affected by such decisions…” (p. 378) 
 
#8  “The business ethics community … does not need people with a thorough knowledge of moral 
theory as much as it needs people who have a journalist’s nose for a good story, and a novelist’s 
talent at spinning it… The business ethics community should welcome people with as many 
different backgrounds as possible…” 
 
#9  We should “…first dream up a sketch of a better world, and only then try to formulate some 
principles, which if acted upon, might bring that world into existence” (p. 378) 
 
#10  “(If not a least a few executives) … are dreaming up idealistic, utopian scenarios for the 
formation of a morally decent global society, it is unlikely that such a society will ever come into 
existence. Perhaps the business ethics community will provide an environment in which such 
dreams are encouraged…” (p. 379) 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 An earlier version of this article was presented at the 13th Annual Conference Promoting Business 
Ethics, Niagara Falls NY, October 2006. Cf. also a somewhat different Norwegian version of this paper 
where the same Ibsen scenes share attention with scenes from Brecht’s Moral School Operas The One 
Who Says Yes and The One Who Says No. 
2 See in addition references such as Fromm, 1947; Levy, 2001; McAdams and Koppensteiner, 1992; 
Robb, 2002; Weisberg and Duffin, 1995; Woolard, 2006. 
3 Cf. in addition to some of the references mentioned in the previous note Carr, 2003; Leck, 2005; 
Shepard et al., 1997. 
4 Ethicists and moral psychologists might face a bias, too, since they know the similar well-known 
classical Heinz’ dilemma too well:  “A woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was 
one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same 
town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times 
what the drug cost him to produce. He paid $200 for the radium and charged $2,000 for a small dose of 
the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he 
could only get together about $ 1,000 which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was 
dying and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said: "No, I discovered the 
drug and I'm going to make money from it." So Heinz got desperate and broke into the man's store to 
steal the drug-for his wife.” (Kohlberg, 1963) The question is then: Should Heinz break into the 
laboratory to steal the drug for his wife? Why or why not? 
5 As a number of literature references about the use of conflict scenarios as research tools and about the 
moral maturity research tradition, cf. Brinkmann, 2002, 2005, both with a few further references; Barter 
and Renold, 1999; Brinkmann and Lentz, 2006; Gibbs et al, 1992; Johnson et al, 1993; Kennedy and 
Lawton, 1996; Maclagan and Snell, 1992; McCabe et al, 1991; Morris and McDonald, 1995; Lysonski 
and Gaidis, 1991; Randall and Gibson, 1990; Robertson, 1993; Smith and Rogers, 2000. 
6 Since Heinz’ dilemma and Nora’s dilemma are strikingly similar (apart from gender), one could even 
investigate if the answers and reasons vary by the gender of the dilemma owner as well as by the gender 
of the respondent. See as a few references about the use of Heinz’ dilemma as a research tool Bergman, 
2002; Caputo, 2000; Commons et al, 2006; Halliday, 2002; Rau and Weber, 2003; Reimer, 2003; 
Wendorf et al, 2002. 
7 For philosopher defences and objections to such criticism cf. De George’s, Koehn’s and Werhane’s 
responses in the same Business Ethics Quarterly-issue (#3, vol. 16). 
8 See appendix 2 below with a tentative reconstruction of 10 “theses” (the numbers below refer to thesis 
numbers in the appendix). We leave it to the reader if such a teaching philosophy should be one 
ingredient in a pluralistic mix of approaches (as suggested for instance by Crane and Matten, 2007) or 
something close to what Gustafson (2000) calls “postmodern business ethics” equal following four 
principles (pp. 652-653, author’s paraphrase): 
1. a holism desire, e.g. no separation personal vs. professional ethics; 
2. instead of abstract, context-free business ethics, rather look at life narratives and analogies; 
3. suspicious of universal theories: build consensus in situations rather than build one-size-fits-any-
situation; 
4. no quests for ethical certainty, but respect pluralism, stay sceptical and flexible. 
9 And if there are still student complaints about the lack of clear answers one could refer to what 
Gustafson has called the “ambiguous world” - which philosophers and business people have in common 
(2000, p. 651). 
10 Rorty quotes and adopts Werhane’s definition of moral imagination (1999, p. 93): “the ability in 
particular circumstances to discover and evaluate possibilities not merely determined by that 
circumstance, or limited by its operative mental models, or merely framed by a set of rules or rule-
governed concerns…” (Rorty, 2006, p. 376). About moral imagination as a business ethics and business 
ethics teaching focus without Rorty’s radicalization, cf. first of all Werhane, 1999 and 1998, also Ciulla, 
1991, 1998 and Vidaver-Cohen, 1998 
